Posts filed under 'Atenista'
It ain’t over ’til it’s over…
Finals is almost done…except for one paper and defense left for thurs…but ‘exams’ is generally over…but i don’t know what exactly to feel about the recent series of exams…maybe i am still stunned with what happened. Things happened so fast and i don’t know if it was ‘fast good’ or ‘fast bad’. heheh…
I’m slowly getting the hang of law school…the world of uncertainty…im coming to realize that law school is indeed a perfect example of the application of everything in philosophy that Loyola school taught its students.
In philosophy, i learned about ‘MERON’, which means plain existence.
‘Ang pagmemeron ng tao na basta na lamang nandyan…pero ano ang meron? Meron bang wala sa meron? Meron bang wala? O maging ang wala ay meron?’ This is where the first discussion on philosophy classes normally revolve…’ANO ANG MERON?’
At the end of it all, after a very thoughtful and almost crazy thinking, it would turn out that the question is simply wrong…because we cannot quantify nor qualify mere existence with the question ‘what’ or ‘ANO?’. That’s how crazy law school is, as it turns out to me…we are made to think things not just out of the box or the books…but even out of this world…but i guess that is what truly makes a good lawyer…being able to anticipate all kinds of attacks. But im telling you, its no joke! We are made to read a pile of readings reaching to one’s waist…to be asked one question regarding an exact phrase from among all those readings…what the heck right? imagine, from all those readings…teachers expect us to remember one single phrase, ‘verbatim’. Duh! But that’s life of law…we have no choice but to strive harder and try to grab all knowledge we can, hoping that the next question would be covered with up to where our studying managed to cover.
This may seem like an exaggeration but this is exactly what we, or at least I, experienced. One sentiment I have is that it is ok for me to read such pile of readings if the question to be asked is at least within the readings. But the sad part is that, sometimes, even though you were successful in reading all the required documents, the question would still not be found there. Or it still needs processing before you can get to the answer…law school requires not only knowledge, but wisdom and understanding… of ALL the matters required…meaning everything in the world. hahaha!
Learning doesn’t stop inside the classroom or the law school. It is only the beginning and is without end…just like ‘MERON’ in philosophy. One must grab all opportunities to learn something new, may it be about things not necessarily connected with law, since law school is about the study of life and living. How people evolve, how they (must) relate to each other, and everything else related to life or living. At the end of it all, the recent finals is not yet final but just the first among the unending series of tests which a law student must take to become a lawyer and will continue until forever, while we are still sane.
I realize that the path I chose to take is no joke…and I am willing to take up the extra-mile, if God permits me…
Add comment October 25th, 2007
LAWYER STORY OF THE YEAR, DECADE AND PROBABLY THE CENTURY.
Charlotte , North Carolina .
A lawyer purchased a box of very rare and
expensive cigars, then insured them against, among
other things, fire.
Within a month, having smoked his entire stockpile
of these great cigars and without yet having made
even his first premium payment on the policy the
lawyer filed a claim against the insurance company.
In his claim, the lawyer stated the cigars were
lost “in a series of small fires.”
The insurance company refused to pay, citing the
obvious reason, that the man had consumed the cigars
in the normal fashion.
The lawyer sued and WON!
(Stay with me.)
Delivering the ruling, the judge agreed with the
insurance company that the claim was frivolous. The
judge stated nevertheless, that the lawyer held a
policy from the company, which it had warranted that
the cigars were insurable and also guaranteed that it would
insure them against fire, without defining what is
considered to be unacceptable “fire” and was
obligated to pay the claim.
Rather than endure lengthy and costly appeal
process, the insurance company accepted the ruling
and paid $15,000 to the lawyer for his loss of the
cigars lost in the “fires”.
NOW FOR THE BEST PART..
After the lawyer cashed the check, the insurance
company had him arrested on 24 counts of ARSON!!!
With his own insurance claim and testimony from
the previous case being used against him, the lawyer
was convicted of intentionally burning his insured
property and was sentenced to 24 months in jail and
a $24,000 fine.
This is a true story and was the First Place
winner in the recent Criminal Lawyers Award Contest.
Add comment October 24th, 2007
Shih Tzu Puppies For Sale
1 boy and 1 girl left
- good champ-line (15 red marks)
- tricolor (white, black, gold/dark brown)
- princess type
- complete with vaccines and papers
Contact Christine: 09174216701
visit shobeceo.multiply.com for more pictures
Add comment October 22nd, 2007
Gomez vs. Ventura and Board of Medical Examiners (54 Phil. 726)
[G.R. No. 32441. March 29, 1930.]
DOMINADOR GOMEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. HONORIO VENTURA, Secretary of the Interior of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and the BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendants-appellees.
Jose Varela Calderon, for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla, for appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS; CHARGES AGAINST PRACTICING PHYSICIANS. — The law (sec. 12, Act No. 3111) does not require that the charges against practicing physicians be preferred by a public officer or by any specified person; it even permits the Board of Medical Examiners itself to require its executive officer to prefer said charges. From the wording of the law we infer that any person, including a public officer, may prefer the charges referred to. The fact that the charges were filed by the assistant fiscal of the City of Manila does not deprive the Board of Medical Examiners of jurisdiction to hear said charges and to take the proper action according to law.
2. OPIUM; OPIUM LAW. — The matter contained in section 9 of the Act No. 2381 (Opium Law) as to prescriptions of opium is not foreign to the end pursued in said Act, and in view of the provision of said section it cannot be maintained that Act No. 2381 includes more than one subject. The provisions contained in that section are simply details and means conducive to the ultimate purpose of said Act, which details and means need not be stated in the title of the Act for the very reason that, properly speaking, they are not foreign matter.
3. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS; POWERS. — The powers vested in the Board of Medical Examiners to suspend or revoke a physician’s certificate of registration and the authority granted the Secretary of the Interior to confirm or reverse the decision of said board of examiners, partake of a quasi-judicial character, that is, involve the use of discretion. For this reason, the exercise thereof cannot be reviewed by mandamus, which is the nature of this cause on is merits.
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D E C I S I O N
ROMUALDEZ, J p:
In this cause, the plaintiff prays for judgment, as follows:
“1. Annulling and setting aside the aforementioned investigation proceedings, and particularly the decision of the Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippine Islands dated March 30, 1926, forever revoking the plaintiff’s license to practice medicine and surgery.
“2. Ordering the defendants to restore the plaintiff to his status before the investigation and the decision of March 30, 1926, that is, as if there had never been an investigation and an adverse decision.
“3. Ordering said defendants to issue in favor of the plaintiff a license for the practice of medicine and surgery in the Philippine Islands, such as he had prior to the investigation and adverse decision.
“4. Granting the plaintiff any other proper legal remedy.” (Pages 5 and 6, bill of exceptions.)
The defendants answered with a general denial and prayed that the complaint be dismissed. After trial the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
Counsel for plaintiff contends that the court below erred:
“1. In holding that Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila was authorized to appear and institute administrative proceedings against Dr. Dominador Gomez before the Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippines.
“2. In not holding that Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix, of the City of Manila, had no personality nor power to institute administrative proceedings against Dr. Dominador Gomez before the Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippines.
“3. In admitting in its decision that section 9 of Act No. 2881, known as the Opium Law, is valid.
“4. In not holding that section 9 of Act No. 2381, known as the Opium Law, is unconstitutional, and therefore null and void.
“5. In holding that section 9 of Act No. 2381, known as the Opium Law, is in force.
“6. In not holding that section 9 of Act No. 2381 has been repealed, even on the supposition that it was valid.
“7. In rendering the judgment appealed from.
“8. In denying the notion for avoidance, and for a new trial, filed by the appellant.”
The first two assignments of error relate to the validity of the charges against the plaintiff, preferred by Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila, who, according to the plaintiff is not authorized by law to file charges with the Board of Medical Examiners, which therefore acquired no jurisdiction over the matter.
According to section 780 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3111, the procedure to be observed in revoking a certificate of registration is the following:
“Proceedings for revocation of a certificate of registration shall be begun by filing a written charge or charges against the accused. These charges may be preferred by any person or persons, firm or corporation, or the Board of Medical Examiners itself may direct its executive officer to prepare said charges. Said charges shall be filed with the executive officer of the Board of Medical Examiners and a copy thereof, together with written notice of the time and place when they will be heard and determined, shall be served upon the accused or his counsel, at least two weeks before the date actually fixed for said hearing.” (Sec. 12, Act No. 3111.)
The law does not require that the charges be preferred by a public officer or by any specified person; it even permits the Board of Medical Examiners itself to require its executive officer to prefer said charges. From the wording of the law we infer that any person, including a public officer, may prefer the charges referred to in the abovequoted provision. Wherefore, the fact that the charges were filed by Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila, does not deprive the Board of Medical Examiners of jurisdiction to hear said charges and to take the proper action according to law.
The appellant contends in his third and fourth assignments of error that section 9 of Act No. 2381 is null and void on the ground of unconstitutionality, since said section is foreign to the subject of said Act, in violation of section 3 of the Jones Law prohibiting the enactment of any bill embracing more than one subject and providing that the subject be expressed in the title of the bill.
Our opinion is that the matter contained in section 9 of Act No. 2381 is not foreign to the end pursued in said Act, and that in view of the provision of said section it cannot be maintained that Act No. 2381 includes more than one subject. The penalty provided in said section for the physician or dentist who prescribes opium for a patient whose physical condition does not require the use of said drug, is one of the means employed by the Legislature to attain the purpose of Act No. 2381, which is, to prohibit unnecessary use of opium; it is one of the details subordinate to the purpose in view. Such punishment is not the end contemplated in Act No. 2381, but, as we have just said, it is a means employed to regulate the use of opium.
In passing said Act No. 2381, the Legislature merely exercised the police power expressly granted by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1905, for the protection of the health, comfort, and general welfare of the people of the Philippine Islands.
“ID.; ID.; POWER OF PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO LEGISLATE UPON THE SUBJECT. — The Philippine Legislature is expressly authorized by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1905, to adopt legislation upon the importation and sale of opium in the Philippine Islands. The purpose of such legislation was to protect the health, comfort, and general welfare of the people of the Philippine Islands. Such legislation was an exercise of the police power of the State.” (United States vs. Wayne Shoup, 35 Phil., 56.)
And, as we have stated, the provisions contained in section 9 of Act No. 2381 relative to physicians and dentists, are simply details and means conducive to the ultimate purpose of said Act, which details and means need not be stated in the title of the Act for the very reason that, properly speaking, they are not foreign matter.
“The general purpose of these provisions is accomplished when a law has but one general object, which is fairly indicated by its title. To require every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of this general object to be provided for by a separate act relating to that alone, would not only be unreasonable, but would actually render legislation impossible.” (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, pp. 296-297.)
“The constitutional requirement is addressed to the subject, not to the details of the act. The subject must be single, the provisions, to accomplish the object involved in that subject, may be multifarious. . . . None of the provisions of a statute will be held unconstitutional when they all relate, directly or indirectly, to the same subject, have a natural connection, and are not foreign to the subject expressed in the title. As very frequently expressed by the courts, any provisions that are germane to the subject expressed in the title may properly be included in the act.” (I Sutherland on Stat. Const., par. 118.)
In order to hold that section 9 of Act No. 2381 is unconstitutional on the ground alleged by the plaintiff, the violation of the constitutional provision must be substantial and manifest. It is not so in the case at bar.
“2. To warrant the setting aside of statutes because their subjects are not expressed in the titles, the violation of the rule must be substantial and plain.” (Posadas vs. Menzi, Decision of the United States Supreme Court, page 388, No. 11, May 15, 1929, United States Supreme Court Advance Opinions.)
At all events the validity of this Opium Law, Act No. 2381, has already been upheld by this court, not only in the above cited case, United States vs. Wayne Shoup, supra, but also in the subsequent case of United States vs. Jao Li Sing (37 Phil., 211).
Passing to the fifth and sixth assignments of error, wherein counsel for appellant contends that even granting that section 9 of Act No. 2381 is valid, it was repealed by Act No. 2493 and later by section 780 of the Administrative Code, we note, first, that there is no express repeal of section 9 of Act No. 2381. Secondly, it cannot be held that it has been impliedly repealed, for the reason that the provisions of section 9, Act No. 2381, are neither contrary to, nor incompatible with, the provisions of section 780 of the Administrative Code, as amended. Upon this point, we approve and adopt the following statements made by the trial judge:
“Counsel contends, in support of the above, that Act No. 2493 being complete, and ‘covering the field’ by implication repealed all laws relating to the practice of medicine, powers of the Board of Medical Examiners and allied matters; hence, the said law, expressly providing the causes for revocation of medical licenses, necessarily excluded all others, even though embodied in prior enactments.
“Act No. 310 provided that the Board of Medical Examiners could revoke licenses for ‘unprofessional conduct,’ without defining the term. Act No. 1761 (the Opium Law) provided that illegally prescribing opium should be cause for revocation of medical licenses. Clearly, the Opium Law did not repeal Act No. 310. Act No. 2381 — also an Opium Law — in its section 9, repeated the provision as to doctors and dentists. The repetition did not repeal Act No. 310. Act No. 2493, section 11 (Ad. Code, sec. 780), provided that certificates of physicians are revokable for ‘unprofessional conduct,’ without defining the phrase. In other words, so far as revocation of licenses is concerned, Act No. 2493 is a mere reënactment of Act No. 310. The reënactment of the said portion of Act No. 310 did not repeal section 9 of the Opium Law. If said section 9 has been repealed, it must be by Act No. 3111, which amends Act No. 2493 (Ad. Code, sec. 780), by an addition after the words ‘unprofessional conduct’ of the following:
“‘The words “unprofessional, immoral, or dishonorable conduct” as used in this chapter shall be construed to include the following acts: (1) Procuring, aiding or abetting a criminal abortion; (2) advertising, either in his own name or in the name of any other person, firm, association, or corporation, in any written or printed paper, or document, of medical business in which untruthful or improbable promises are made, or being employed by, or in the service of any person, firm, association or corporation so advertising, or advertising in any obscene manner derogatory to good morals; (3) habitual intemperance or addition to the use of morphine, opium, cocaine, or other drugs having a similar effect; (4) conviction of a crime or misdemeanor involving dishonorable conduct; and (5) willfully betraying a professional secret.’
“It cannot be seriously contended that aside from the five examples specified there can be no other conduct of a physician deemed ‘unprofessional.’ Nor can it be convincingly argued that the Legislature intended to wipe out all other forms of ‘unprofessional’ conduct theretofore deemed grounds for revocation of licenses. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent and should not be permitted to defeat the plain indicated purpose of the Legislature. It does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example, or to remove doubts. (See Cyc., 1122.) If, therefore, there exists ‘unprofessional conduct’ not specified in the laws, with more reason does the criminal use of opium remain a specific cause for revocation of license.” (Pages 11, 12 and 13, bill of exceptions.)
As to the seventh and eighth assignments of error, we find the judgment appealed from correctly rendered, and the motion of avoidance and new trial properly denied.
As the Attorney-General correctly observes, the powers vested in the Board of Medical Examiners to suspend or revoke a physician’s certificate of registration and the authority granted the Secretary of the Interior of confirming or reversing the decision of said board of examiners, partake of a quasi-judicial character, that is, involve the use of discretion. For this reason, the exercise thereof cannot be reviewed by mandamus, which is the nature of this cause on its merits.
“As in the case of courts and judicial officers, it is a rule of general application that mandamus will, not lie to review or control the acts of executive officers and boards of state and federal governments in respect of matters as to which they are vested with discretion. In other words, they cannot be compelled to act or render a decision in any particular way, and this is so, even though the exercise of this discretion requires the construction and interpretation of statutes. Where public officials exercise their discretion, it is said that their conclusions, although disputable, are impregnable to mandamus.” (38 C. J., 659-660.)
That this action is really a mandamus proceeding, appears clearly from the terms of the complaint filed herein.
Finding no merit in the assignments of error, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Villamor, J., reserves his vote.
Add comment September 21st, 2007
Statutory Construction, here we come…
Finally…after 3 resets for the midterm schedule on Statutory Construction, the agony is going to end today…so what does Construction mean? Nahh..not the building…Statutory Construction, as defined in Caltex vs. Palomar, is “an art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where the intention is rendered doubtful, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in law.”
The minds of our legislators are but finite and cannot encompass all possible cases into the statutes or laws they enact, thus, there are times where the law is ambiguous in its applicability to certain cases, and so we need construction and interpretation. Laurel’s book on Statutory Construction defines construction as “the drawing of conclusions with respect to subjects that are beyond the direct expressions of the text, from the elements known and given in the text, while interpretation is the process of discovering the true meaning of the language used.” The interpretation goes to explain and dig deeper the meaning of the text or languages used while construction goes beyond the language and tries to see the intent of the framers and whether the case falls within the ambit of the law.
The very long case of Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit ng mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. points out the steps in interpreting the content of laws, namely, (1) Verba Legis or the plain meaning of the text as how a normal individual would interpret and understand it, (2) Ratio Legis Est Anima or through digging up the intent of the framers when they constructed the law, (3) Ut Magis Valeat Quam Pereat, meaning the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and other parts of the Constitution must be looked upon in order to see the real meaning and intent of a law, and lastly, (4) it may be determined by looking through the plethora of cases or jurisprudence as to how such law was interpreted.
Statutory Construction is trying to listen to what the law really tell.
2 comments August 17th, 2007
MESSAGE TO THE INCOMING 2007 FRESHMEN
By: Dean Cesar L. Villanueva
I formally welcome each of you to the Ateneo Law School.
Although each of you have an individual basis for choosing to be in the Ateneo, there can be no doubt that you are in for an entirely new, and ultimately life-changing, experience under the Juris Doctor (J.D.) program of the Law School. Since its introduction in the Philippine legal educational system in 1988 and with its first graduates in 1991, the J.D. program has shown remarkable consistency and excellence in the field of legal education: highest passing percentage in the annual Bar Examinations (with always an Atenean in the top ten placers); awards and honors in international moot court competitions; annual crop of leading legal articles embodied in the J.D. theses, and annual public service by J.D. students through clinical legal education, apprenticeship and human rights internship. The J.D. curriculum has become the gold-standard in legal education in the country.
But being in the Ateneo Law School comes with a heavy price. The rigors and demands of the program would take its toll on many of you: long hours of studies, almost unbearable course loads, and sometimes almost unbearable professors. There are those among you who have never received a failing mark in life, who will come out more than satisfied with receiving passing grades in some of the heavy courses. There are many of you who will realize soon enough that past honors, achievements and distinctions in high school or college would amount to nothing, and cannot overshadow your daily output and grind in the Law School. The Ateneo program would demand from each you so much more than what you thought you could possibly give; to reach out beyond what you thought was possible to reach; to become the best of what you possibly can be as a person.
Why is the Ateneo Law system seemingly so harsh, and at times, almost unforgiving? Each of you are asked to join the ranks of “Atenean lawyers� faithful to the Mission of the Law School: to be “men and women not only skilled in the science and art of the law, but also imbued with a burning passion for justice and the fervent series to serve others.� The Law School demands from each of you “intellectual rigor in the tradition of Jesuit education . . . a thorough grasp of the nature and ends of law, the ability to express legal conviction in forceful oral and written communication, and sensitivity to the role of law as an interment of service towards individuals and of social engineering.�
If during the study of the Law you cannot make the ultimate sacrifice of losing yourself into the becoming the best law student you possible can and then more, then there is little hope that as a professional you would be the best lawyer to champion justice for your clients and for our society. Not many of you can make that transformation: many are called but few are chosen. For those of you who will dedicate their whole being to making that happen, four years from now you shall find yourself in the rank of a select group of Atenean men and women who upon receiving their Ateneo diploma would know by their whole being that the have, if they so wish, the capacity to change Philippine society.
I bid you God’s blessings into a journey that you have embarked on. You must be willing to let your old self die in the process of studying law in the Ateneo, for it is only in such dying that you can transform yourself God’s instrument for bringing good into the legal world.
Add comment August 8th, 2007
Wahh…its midterms week…
It’s deadly midterms week…my first, hopefully not the last, batch of exams at law school. It’s going back to square one where everyone is nervous and in panic attack for no one really knows how exams in law school go about.
Everyone seems to be busy with their own cramming, este studying…well the first day, yesterday went quite well, but the result is yet to be known. You see, law school is a big dome of uncertainty.
First, many people “at the law school” still don’t know why they are there. And for those who are already sure that they want to be there, they still don’t know if how long they’re gonna be there, heheh. A lot of things really depend to many other things other than the law student’s will. Like the professor’s discretion. Yesterday’s exam seemed well to me, but what about ACA Villches? hmm…hope she knows that I’m writing about her now, hahah! I really wish that she’ll be lenient and considerate with the exams and of course give high grades. The only comfort that a law student may have in law school is the fact that he/she gave it his/her best shot, but even that may still seem to be not enough to get good grades. Especially if the professor is so tough and expects you to be a walking SCRA and a thumbling Constitution… 
But then again, everything is for a reason, the toughest professors serve as the greatest trainors. Students become more tough, precise, and push us to work harder each time. And that is what Ateneo distinctively have, I suppose. Well, anyways…have to rest a bit for laterz exam…Hi Mr. Jon Lina of Block 1-E..hahaha…I’ve granted your request na ha..heheh…he’s the first reader of my blog from the campus..hahaha…at least I have one na
Til next post! ^_^
1 comment August 7th, 2007
Manila RailRoad Company vs. Insular Collector of Customs
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 30264. March 12, 1929.]
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee, vs. INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, defendant-appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla, for appellant.
Jose C. Abreu for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CUSTOMS DUTIES; TAXATION; CLASSIFICATION OF DUST SHIELDS UNDER THE TARIFF LAW. — Dust shields are classified for the purposes of the tariff under paragraph 197 of section 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909 as detached parts of vehicles for use on railways and not under paragraph 141 of the same section of the law as manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for.
2. STATUTES; TAX LAWS; BURDEN OF PROOF. — The burden is upon the importer to overcome the presumption of a legal collection of duties by proof that their exaction was unlawful. The question to be decided is not whether the Collector was wrong but whether the importer was right.
3. ID.; ID.; CONSTRUCTION. — It is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes or duties not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language used. In every case of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly against the Government and in favor of the citizen, because burdens are not be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly import.
4. ID.; CONSTRUCTION OF GENERAL AND PARTICULAR PROVISIONS. — Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.
D E C I S I O N
MALCOLM, J p:
The question involved in this appeal is the following: How should dust shields be classified for the purposes of the tariff, under paragraph 141 or under paragraph 197 of section 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909? These paragraphs placed in parallel columns for purposes of comparison read:
“141. Manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for, forty per centum ad valorem.”
“197. Vehicles for use on railways, and detached parts thereof, ten per centum ad valorem.”
Dust shields are manufactured of wool and hair mixed. The component material of chief value is the wool. They are used by the Manila Railroad Company on all of its railway wagon. The purpose of the dust shield is to cover the axle box in order to protect from dust the oil deposited therein which serves to lubricate the bearings of the wheel. “Dust guard,” which is the same as “dust shield,” is defined in the work Car Builders’ Cyclopedia of American Practice, 10th ed., 1922, p. 41, as follows: “A thin piece of wood, leather, felt, asbestos or other material inserted in the dust guard chamber at the back of a journal box, and fitting closely around the dust guard bearing of the axle. Its purpose is to exclude dust and to prevent the escape of oil and waste. Sometimes called axle packing or box packing.”
Based on these facts, it was the decision of the Insular Collector of Customs that dust shields should be classified as “manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for.” That decision is entitled to our respect. The burden is upon the importer to overcome the presumption of a legal collection of duties by proof that their exaction was unlawful. The question to be decided is not whether the Collector was wrong but whether the importer was right. (Erchardt vs. Schroeder [1984], 155 U. S., 124; Behn, Meyer & Co. vs. Collector of Customs [1913], 26 Phil., 627.) On the other hand, His Honor, Judge Simplicio del Rosario, took an opposite view, overruled the decision of the Collector of Customs, and held that dust shields should be classified as “detached parts” of vehicles for use on railways. This impartial finding is also entitled to our respect. It is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes or duties not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language used. In every case of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly against the Government and in favor of the citizen, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly import. (U. S. vs. Wigglesworth [1842], 2 Story, 369; Froechlich & Kuttner vs. Collector of Customs [1911], 18 Phil., 461.)
There are present two fundamental considerations which guide the way out of the legal dilemma. The first is by taking into account the purpose of the article and then acknowledging that it is in reality used as a detached part of railway vehicles. The second point is that paragraph 141 is a general provision while paragraph 197 is a special provision. Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular, enactment must be operative, and the general language are not within the provisions of the particular enactment (25 R. C. L., p. 1010, citing numerous cases).
We conclude that the trial judge was correct in classifying dust shields under paragraph 197 of section 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909, and in refusing to classify them under paragraph 141 of the same section of the law. Accordingly, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed in its entirely, without special taxation of costs in either instance.
Johnson, Street, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Add comment August 2nd, 2007
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